Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments by Starnes, Cynthia Lee
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2012
Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling
Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments
Cynthia Lee Starnes
Michigan State University College of Law, starnesc@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 197
(2012).
LOVERS, PARENTS, AND PARTNERS:
DISENTANGLING SPOUSAL AND
CO-PARENTING COMMITMENTS
Cynthia Lee Stames
This Article offers a fresh perspective on a problem that has long vexed legal
scholars. The problem is a fundamental one: Although divorced parents share
legal responsibility for their children, the parent who serves as primary caretaker
bears most of the opportunity costs associated with that responsibility. Emerging
custody norms may teach that divorce should not end spouses' roles as co-parents,
but laws governing property, alimony, and even child support remain wed to the
clean-break myth that divorce can end or minimize all economic ties between
spouses with children. Divorced caretakers are thus told they must share rights to
children, but that they have no right to share the family wage that once supported
caretaking labor.
The solution to the conceptual bind of the primary caretaker lies in an expanded
vision of commitments between intimate partners and a narrowed vision of the role
of divorce. In this Article, I argue that married parents are committed to each
other on two levels-as intimate partners through marriage and as co-parenting
partners through the addition of children to their family. Divorce ends the
marriage, but it does not end the parents' responsibility to share the financial
costs and daily labors required to raise their children to majority. Disentangled
from the marital commitment, the co-parenting commitment provides a conceptual
basis for income sharing between divorced parents of minor children and
ultimately an answer to the disparate costs ofpost-divorce caretaking.
* Professor of Law and the John F. Schaefer Chair of Matrimonial Law,
Michigan State University College of Law. For his generous and insightful comments on
various points in this Article, I am indebted to my late colleague and friend Craig Callen. I
am also grateful to my colleagues at the MSU Law Faculty Reading Group and the Summer
Research Workshop, to Lori Blankenship, to Flavio Van Boekel, and to the amazing
reference librarians at MSU Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Marriage is not reserved for "baby makers."' And divorce is not reserved
for those who would undo their status as parents. Divorcing parents understand
this latter point well enough; at least, it is what they tell their children2:
This is not about you. It's not your fault. Your mom/dad and I need
to live apart but we'll still love you and be there for you. We'll still
be your parents. We're not divorcing you.
1. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed in its opinion striking
down the state's same-sex marriage ban, "While it is certainly true that many, perhaps most,
married couples have children together (assisted or unassisted), it is the exclusive and
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage." Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). As Thaler and Sunstein note, however, marriage has not
always been so understood: "[T]he marital institution was originally a means of government
licensing of both sexual activities and child rearing." RICHARD H. THALER & CAss R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 221
(2008).
2. "Children" is used throughout this Article to connote minor children.
"Minor" is sometimes added as a descriptor for clarity or emphasis.
3. Parenting education programs for divorcing parents encourage these types of
conversations with children. See, e.g., Telling Your Children About the Divorce,
DuMMIES.CoM, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/telling-your-children-about-the-
divorce.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (stating that parents should tell children they "will
always be there for them" and that the divorce "has absolutely nothing to do with them");
see also WENDY LOKKEN ET AL., YOU AND ME MAKE THREE (2008); 4 Tips for Helping Your
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Custody norms reinforce such parental assurances, increasingly reflecting the view
that divorce should not end the spouses' roles as co-parents. Laws governing the
economics of divorce, however, remain wed to the clean-break myth that divorce
can end or minimize all economic ties between spouses with children. Hardest hit
by the law's conflicting messages of sharing and disentanglement are the many
primary caretakers5 who, after divorce, share rights to children, but not to the
family wage that once supported caretaking labor.6 In addition to an immediate
Children During Your Divorce, PARENTCLASS.NET, http://parentclass.net/resources/
parenting class divorcel.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012); Co-Parenting Through
Separation and Divorce: Children First, N.D. STATE UNIV. (Oct. 1996),
http://www.ag.ndsu.edu/pubs/yf/famsci/fs565w.htm. For a critique of parenting education
programs for their blame-the-victim perspective, see Tali Schaefer, Saving Children or
Blaming Parents? Lessons from Mandated Parenting Classes, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
491, 491-93 (2010).
4. For an insightful look at the clash between clean-break and co-parenting
models in the context of parental-relocation disputes, see Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?
Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 138-43
(2007). Professor Glennon argues that parents should share the costs of a custodian's denied
petition to relocate. Id. at 138-43.
5. The term "primary caretaker" is used in this Article to describe a parent who
assumes the majority of family care. Family care is defined broadly to include both child-
centered labor such as nurturing and training children, and housework that sustains the
home in which children are raised. The West Virginia Supreme Court has offered helpful
guidelines for identifying the primary caretaker:
In establishing which .. . parent is the primary caretaker, the trial court
shall determine which parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter
alia, the performance of the following caring and nurturing duties of a
parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care,
including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social
interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses
or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative
care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night,
attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet
training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
Professor Katharine Silbaugh has provided a helpful description of housework. It
involves "preparing meals, washing dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shopping,
washing and ironing, paying bills, auto maintenance, driving,. . . making coffee, feeding the
baby, emptying garbage, answering the telephone, planning family activities, making beds,
caring for pets, weeding, sweeping floors, or putting clothes away." Katharine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1996)
(footnote omitted); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 55 (1997) (stating that household labor "involves nasty, tedious
physical tasks-standing over a hot stove, cleaning toilets, scrubbing stains off of floors and
out of shirts, changing diapers and bedpans").
6. As Professor Glennon has pointed out, these conflicting messages may
benefit non-custodial parents who have "freedom to make a clean break economically along
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decline in financial status,7 these divorced parents often face new opportunity costs
generated by their continuing role as primary caregivers.8 Their story is a sad
postscript to the happy rhetoric of sharing in contemporary custody norms, a
peculiar twist on the tenet that children are the responsibility of both parents, and a
logical outcome of the clean-break myth.
The problem of the primary caretaker is a fundamental one with which
legal scholars have long grappled, but not yet come to grips. 9 In this Article, I
with an entitlement to claim the benefits of the coparenting approach." Glennon, supra note
4, at 141.
7. Many studies have found that divorce has a harsher economic impact on
women and children than on men. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., The Gender Gap in
the Economic Well-Being ofNonresident Fathers and Custodial Mothers, 36 DEMOGRAPHY
195, 201 (1999) (indicating that non-custodial fathers' economic well-being is double that
of custodial mothers and children); Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan & Judith Wallerstein,
Visitation and Child Support Guidelines: A Comment on Fabricius and Braver, 42 FAM. CT.
REV. 342, 345 (2004) ("[O]n average, throughout the income distribution, after payment of
child support is subtracted from the father's income and added to the mother's and child's
income, the standard of living of nonresident fathers is still about twice that of the mothers
and children."); E. Mavis Hetherington & Margaret Stanley-Hagan, The Adjustment of
Children with Divorced Parents: A Risk and Resiliency Perspective, 40 J. CHILD PSYCHOL.
& PSYCHIATRY 129, 134 (1999) (reporting that mothers with primary custody suffer a 25%
to 45% drop in family income); Patricia A. McManus & Thomas A. DiPrete, Losers and
Winners: The Financial Consequences of Separation and Divorce for Men, 66 AM. Soc.
REV. 246, 257, 266 (2001) (stating that men who provided more than 80% of family income
experienced a 17% increase in standard of living after separation; other men experienced
little change or some decline in living standards; and "most women would have to make
heroic leaps" to keep their losses this small); Liana C. Sayer, Economic Aspects of Divorce
and Relationship Dissolution, in HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION
385, 390 (Mark A. Fine & John H. Harvey eds., 2006) (stating that in all surveyed studies
"women and children experience substantial declines in economic well-being" after
divorce). The explanation for this disparate impact lies at least partly in women's continuing
role as primary caretakers and the earnings losses linked to that role. See infra Part I.
8. For a discussion of the costs of caretaking, including job disruption or
disinvestment and accompanying losses in earnings and earning capacity, see infra Part I.
9. Many commentators have called attention to the plight of the divorcing
primary caretaker. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY
(1989); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000); Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at
Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713 (2000); Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177 (2000); June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family
in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359 (1994); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security
Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the
Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721 (1993); Joan M. Krauskopf, Comments
on Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 417
(1994); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law:
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008); Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Silbaugh,
supra note 5; Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103
(1989); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67
200
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argue that the solution to the conceptual bind of the primary caretaker lies in an
expanded vision of commitment between intimate partners and a narrowed vision
of the role of divorce. Using partnership imagery and taking marriage as an easy, if
non-exclusive, signal of commitment, I argue that married parents are committed
to each other on two levels-as intimate life partners through marriage and as co-
parents through the addition of children to their family. Spouses who share
children understand and implicitly agree that they will share the costs and benefits
of raising those children. This co-parenting commitment complements each
parent's individual obligation to the child, adding a new layer of responsibility that
runs between parents. As co-parents, partners share responsibility for the financial
costs and physical labor required to raise their children to majority, including the
opportunity costs likely to fall disproportionately on the parent who serves as
primary caretaker. Family law must expand its understanding of commitment to
recognize that married parents are more than spouses."
My proposal is to further redefine and limit the role of divorce in ending
commitments between married parents. Divorcing parents may not love or even
like each other,12 but while the loss of intimate affection is a basis for ending a
(1993) [hereinafter Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker]; Cynthia Lee Starnes,
Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1513
(2005) [hereinafter Stames, Mothers as Suckers].
10. Marriage is a common and clear signal of commitment. See NAOMI CAHN &
JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION
OF CULTURE 162 (2010) ("The critical role of marriage for all couples is the public
declaration of commitment. . . ."). Marriage is not the only signal of intimate commitment;
other committed intimate relationships include civil unions and registered domestic
partnerships. Cohabitation between marriage-eligible intimates ordinarily does not signal
commitment. Indeed, the American Law Institute's ("ALl") proposal to impose a legal
status on some cohabitants has been criticized as conscriptive, creating legal obligations
between parties who did not intend to undertake any. For the ALI proposal, see AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 6 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (concerning domestic partnerships). For a critique,
see Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 846 (2005) ("Cohabitation usually functions,
in the eyes of cohabitants themselves, as a substitute for being single, not for being married.
Cohabitation thus does not imply marital commitment.").
11. Some have argued that ties between adults and children rather than ties
between adults are the key source of legal obligation. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE, FROM
PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW, at xiii (2000) ("[T]he
code of family responsibility is being rewritten in terms of the only ties left-the ones to
children."). Ties to children are certainly important, but so are ties to other adults. Indeed, if
the same-sex marriage movement has taught us anything, it is that legal ties between
intimate adults are significant enough to be worth fighting for. Moreover, an adult can be
committed both to a child and to a co-parent. These ties are not in competition; there is no
zero-sum game. See infra Part III.
12. Actually, divorcing parents may not be as hostile as popularly assumed.
Studies suggest many divorcing spouses experience "little if any conflict over the terms of
the divorce decree." ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 159 (1992) (reporting that 75% of families
studied had low-conflict divorces). As Tali Schaefer observed, "[J]udges get a distorted
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marriage, it is not a basis for ending a commitment to shared parenting. Indeed,
custody norms are premised on an assumption that the end of intimacy should not
trigger the end of co-parenting. Even as custody law increasingly nudges parents to
expect to keep their co-parenting rights, so should laws governing the economics
of divorce nudge them to expect to keep their co-parenting responsibilities. Default
rules1 3 governing property distribution, alimony, and child support, however, do
just the opposite-conflating marriage and parenthood, and nudging parents to
believe the clean-break myth that divorce can and should end all commitments
between them.' 4
Default rules are sticky, affecting what people do, what they want to do,
and what they feel entitled to do.' 5 Even as current default rules now foster a sense
of individual entitlement that disadvantages primary caretakers, so could these
rules encourage a sense of continuing responsibility to a co-parent who undertakes
the lion's share of children's daily care. 16 Disentangled from the spousal
commitment, the co-parenting commitment provides a compelling basis for new
default rules that recognize divorced parents' joint responsibility for the full costs
of parenting shared children.
picture of how acrimonious divorce is and how unreasonable and self-involved parents are
because the worst cases are the ones that they get to hear." Schaefer, supra note 3, at 513.
13. Default rules apply if the parties do not enter an agreement or if their
agreement contains gaps or ambiguities. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Content, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). In the case of
marriage, divorce laws governing property distribution and alimony are largely default rules
because they generally apply only when spouses fail to agree on these economic exit terms.
Prenuptial agreements may be used to opt out of these rules, although these agreements are
rare. See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
75, 80 n.12 (2004) (stating that although only approximately 5% of all marriages involve
prenuptial agreements, 20% of second marriages do).
14. Nudging parents to break their commitments is especially troublesome if it is
true, as some suggest, that people are generally inclined to keep their commitments, or at
least to take them seriously. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 224 ("[E]ven without
a government licensing scheme or legal sanction, people take their private commitments
seriously.").
15. See id. at 227. As Thaler and Sunstein explain: "[W]hat people wish to do is
likely to be affected by the law's default rules. If the law establishes a standard practice,
many people will follow it." Id. As Adrienne Davis notes, marital default rules are
"notoriously sticky" and "crucial" because "[e]ven when parties are predisposed to bargain
around them, their best efforts to do so may come under heightened legal scrutiny and not
be enforced." Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2001-02 (2010).
16. In their chapter on marriage, Thaler and Sunstein suggest the case of the
primary caretaker as an opportunity for a default rule that could protect the vulnerable.
If the default rule says that special help will be provided to those
who have been the primary caretakers of the children, then that rule is
likely to stick. . .. And if the default rule says that upon divorce the
primary caretaker will continue as such, and receive financial assistance,
that rule will also tend to stick.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 227.
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As an example of the difference my proposal would make, consider the
common case of the couple who, after eight years of marriage and two children,
decide to divorce.17 The mother earns much less than the father, primarily because
her role as primary family caregiver compromised her investment in the
workplace, leading to gaps in her employment; part-time employment; or family-
friendly, full-time employment that was more flexible but less remunerative than
available alternatives.' 8 The divorce court will strive to give these spouses an
economic clean break, dividing scant marital property 9 and awarding the mother
little or no alimony.2 o While the custody order may speak of shared parenting, the
mother will likely undertake primary responsibility for the children's daily
physical care, either immediately or soon after divorce. 21 The father will pay child
support in an amount designed to approximate spending on the children during
marriage, but this sum will leave the standard of living of the mother and children
far below that of the father.22 If this mother's post-divorce caretaking
responsibilities generate new opportunity costs, they are hers alone to bear. 23
My proposal offers the conceptual basis for a different outcome. Under
this proposal, divorce signals formal termination of the parties' commitment as
intimate partners, but it does not signal termination of their commitment as co-
parents. Whether or not the mother and father like each other, their co-parenting
commitment continues. After divorce, each parent remains committed both to his
or her child, and also to the other parent, with whom he or she has agreed to share
the daily labor, the financial expenditures, and the opportunity costs of raising
shared children. The parents are no longer linked as intimates, but they continue to
be linked as co-parents, bound by their agreement to share the full costs of
parenting. As a practical matter, child support may continue to reflect each
parent's obligation to share the price of a box of macaroni and cheese
(metaphorically speaking), but for co-parents more is required. An additional sum,
either folded into child support or added as a supplement, will be required to
reflect the parents' mutual promises to share not only the price of macaroni and
cheese, but also the reduced income and long-term opportunity costs likely to stem
from primary childcare. This continuing co-parenting commitment provides a
conceptual basis for a new form of income sharing between divorced parents. 24
17. First marriages that end in divorce last a median of eight years. ROSE M.
KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P70-97, NUMBER,
TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001, at 9 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-97.pdf.
18. See infra Part I.
19. Most divorces involve minimal property. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
20. Alimony awards are rare. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 47.
22. For a critique of current child support laws on the ground that they are too
low, see infra note 103.
23. For a compelling personal tale of the costs of opting out for a divorced
mother, see Katy Read, Regrets of a Stay-at-Home Mom, SALON (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:01 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2011/01/06/wish i hadnt opted out.
24. This conceptual foundation for cost sharing is most compelling and most
useful in cases of middle-class parents. Very low-income parents have little to share, and
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This proposal represents a dramatic conceptual shift in family law's
understandings of intimate and parental commitments and of the role of divorce. It
also advances the (curiously) radical proposition that the law should listen when
parents say divorce is not about children.
Part I of this Article briefly documents the motherhood penalty-the lost
earnings and earning potential linked to primary family caretaking,
overwhelmingly performed by women. Part II critiques the conflation of marriage
and parenthood in current laws governing the economics of divorce, summarizing
the structure, goals, and failures of rules governing property distribution, alimony,
and traditional child support. Part III turns to the law of custody, exploring the
shared-parenting norm, the realities of post-divorce primary caretaking, and the
failure of child support models based on clean-break myths to equitably address
shared-parenting arrangements. Part IV reconceptualizes marriages with children,
briefly reviewing the marital partnership model I have long advocated, describing
a complementary co-parenting partnership between spouses with children, and
exploring the impact of divorce on each of these two partnerships. Part V identifies
some of the issues that should drive the next conversation necessary to build on the
conceptual foundation offered in this Article.
I. THE COSTS OF CARE
In his much-cited 1988 book, economist Victor Fuchs reported that the
primary cause of the earnings gap between men and women is family
responsibility that compromises women's workplace investments.25 Controlling for
education, Fuchs found that the hourly wages of women aged 30 to 39 declined
proportionately with the number of children in the family.26 For women, concluded
Fuchs, "the greatest barrier to economic equality is children." 27
Newer studies confirm a continuing "motherhood penalty" in the form of
reduced earnings and earning capacity for women with children.28 In a recently
there is no good reason to plunge a non-custodial parent into poverty by forcing him or her
to share more than a nominal amount of income with a poverty-stricken custodian. One
parent in poverty is certainly enough. Public remedies may offer a better outcome for these
parents. Very high income parents may have significant assets which will ameliorate the
primary caretaker's opportunity costs.
25. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 62 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 147.
28. In her popular book on the subject, Ann Crittenden calculates that lost
lifetime earnings of a mother can exceed $1 million for college-educated women. See ANN
CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS
STILL THE LEAST VALUED 5 (2001). Although most studies focus on mothers, who are most
often the primary family caretakers, parental responsibilities can also affect the earnings of
fathers. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FRED": Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1330-31 (2008) (stating that both mothers and fathers may
experience discrimination because of family responsibilities); see also CAHN & CARBONE,
supra note 10, at 191 ("[A]s every student of the 'mommy track' knows, departure from the
model of full-time worker brings disproportionate decreases in benefits and pay-and these
204 [VOL. 54:197
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released study of earnings inequality among white women, for example,
researchers at the University of Massachusetts Amherst found that "a significant
motherhood penalty persists at all earnings levels."29 Childrearing hits lowest-paid
women the hardest: Earnings losses ranged from 15% per child for low-wage
workers to approximately 2.5% per child for highly paid workers.30
What accounts for this motherhood penalty? The answer begins with
recognition of mothers' continuing role as primary family caretakers. For reasons
that may seem mysterious or even disturbing, married mothers continue to
undertake a disparately large share of family caretaking. Reports of this role
abound. In 2004, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that adult women in
households with children under age 18 spent approximately 1.7 hours per day
providing primary childcare, while men in the same households spent
approximately 50 minutes.3 1 In households with a child under age six, women
averaged 2.7 hours of primary childcare per day, while men averaged 1.2 hours.32
When hours spent on housework are included, the disparity in men's and
women's share of family labor increases. In a seminal study of work-family
conflict, Arlie Hochschild reported that women worked roughly 15 hours longer
each week than men; in the course of a year, they worked an extra 24 days.33 A
more recent study found that not much has changed-women spend more than half
their working hours on housework while men spend less than one-fourth.34 The
American Law Institute sums up women's continuing role as primary caretakers
neatly enough:
decreases may be even more disproportionate for the fathers who would like to spend more
time with their children.").
29. See Michelle J. Budig & Melissa J. Hodges, Differences in Disadvantage:
Variation in the Motherhood Penalty Across White Women's Earnings Distribution, 75 AM.
Soc. REV. 705, 705 (2010). For other studies of the motherhood penalty, see DIANA
FURCHTGOTr-ROTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA, WOMEN'S FIGURES: THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF
WOMEN IN AMERICA 8 (1996); Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty:
Which Mothers Pay It and Why?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 354, 356-57 (2002); Hiromi
Taniguchi, The Timing of Childbearing and Women's Wages, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1008,
1014 (1999). For a study of the effect of motherhood on employment rates, see HEATHER
BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT? DEBUNKING
THE MYTH 11-12 (2005), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/
optout_2005_11_2.pdf.
30. Budig & Hodges, supra note 29, at 717.
31. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AMERICAN TIME USE
SURVEY technical note (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
atus_09202005.pdf. The Bureau's definition of "primary childcare" included "physical care;
playing with children; reading to children; assistance with homework; attending children's
events; taking care of children's health care needs; and dropping off, picking up, and
waiting for children." Id.
32. Id.; see also Cahn, supra note 9, at 182 n.21 ("[M]others of pre-school age
children spend 100 hours more per month than men in childcare.").
33. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME 3-4 (1989).
34. Silbaugh, supra note 5, at 10-13.
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[D]espite the dramatic changes in the workforce participation of
married women over the last several decades, marital roles have
persisted and their impact on the work experiences of married
women remains great. Whether or not women actually leave full-
time employment after the birth of their children, studies
consistently show that they usually perform far more than half of the
married couple's domestic chores.
Married mothers' primary responsibilities in the home often impact their
investments in the paid economy. 3 Primary family caretakers have less time and
perhaps less energy to invest in a job; they also require jobs that offer the
flexibility necessary to accommodate family demands. Not surprisingly, primary
caretakers often disinvest in the marketplace-a disinvestment that may take many
forms. A mother may drop out of the job market altogether, eschewing paid
employment in order to serve as a full-time caretaker. Although their numbers
have clearly declined in recent decades, 37 these "Betty Crocker" homemakers are
still real. In 2009, almost 36% of women with children under age six were not in
the job force.38 In the same year, over 43% of mothers with children under age one
were not in the labor force; and almost 23% of mothers with children ages 6 to 17
were not in the labor force. 39 As these data suggest, for many women, full-time
homemaking is a temporary phenomenon, as they forego paid employment while
children are very young and return to the labor force when children enter school or
pre-school.40
Often, married mothers combine market labor with primary caretaking,
working two shifts-one in the private sphere and another in the public sphere.41
35. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 5.05 Reporter's Notes cmt. d (citation
omitted).
36. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C § 2601(a)(5)
(2006) ("[T]he primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such
responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of
men[.]").
37. In 1998, the number of full-time homemakers stood at 20%, a decrease from
32% in 1978. Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic
Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 19-31 (2000).
38. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment
Characteristics of Families-2010, at tbls. 5 & 6 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/famee.pdf.
39. Id.
40. See ELAINE SORENSEN, EXPLORING THE REASONS BEHIND THE NARROWING
GENDER GAP IN EARNINGS 3 (1991) (reporting that over 84% of women between ages 35
and 41 had periodically dropped out of the labor market). Sorensen reports that these
women never rebounded to the earnings levels of non-Gappers, even 20 years after their last
gap in employment. Id. at 15; see also Sarah Avellar & Pamela J. Smock, Has the Price of
Motherhood Declined Over Time?: A Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage
Penalty, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 597, 598-99 (2003) (observing that mothers who
undertake both home and market labor have more sporadic participation in the job market
than men).
41. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 33.
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Many of these mothers work part-time as an answer to the need for flexibility.42
Others work full-time but choose flexible, family-friendly work that offers less pay
and fewer opportunities for advancement than available alternatives.43
The primary family responsibilities that lead married mothers to limit
paid employment go far in explaining the motherhood penalty. Minimized
investments in the job market often mean less pay, less advancement, and, over
time, reduced earning potential as opportunities disappear.44 These costs of
caretaking may not be apparent during marriage as a mother shares the family
wage with a higher-income spouse. Divorce, however, unmasks the human capital
costs of caretaking. Despite the frequency of this scenario, laws governing the
economics of divorce offer no satisfactory tools for dealing with divorcing parents'
disparate economic positioning.
II. CLEAN-BREAK ECONOMICS
No-fault divorce laws aim for spousal disentanglement, generally
assuming that the end of marriage should trigger an end to all interspousal
commitments.45 These rules have long been criticized for their failure to achieve
equity between spouses, an inequity that is exacerbated when spouses are
parents. 46 The explanation for this inequity is simple enough-if divorce severs the
tie between parents and ignores the earning-capacity differential between primary
caretakers and primary wage earners, the divorced mother will bear most of the
market costs of past family roles, while the father will enjoy most of the benefits.
The clean-break myth makes this outcome likely. Clean-break myths also ensure
42. Ann Crittenden reports that in 1996, "married working mothers on average
put 1,197 hours into their paying jobs, a mere half of the 2,132 hours averaged by married
fathers." CRITTENDEN, supra note 28, at 18. Ira Mark Ellman reports that when a husband's
income exceeds $75,000, the vast majority of married mothers do not work full-time.
Ellman, supra note 37, at 19-31.
43. For a compelling review of mothers' exodus from corporations and
professions, see CRITTENDEN, supra note 28, at 28-44.
44. In an interesting review of employer perceptions of mothers, Professors
Williams and Segal report that when a woman "gets pregnant, takes maternity leave, or
adopts a flexible work arrangement-she may begin to be perceived as a low-competence
caregiver rather than as a high-competence business woman." Joan C. Williams & Nancy
Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated
Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 95-98 (2003).
45. This goal of disentanglement is central to the sweeping no-fault reforms of
the 1970s. The no-fault movement rejected fault as a basis for divorce, shunning a view of
divorce as a remedy for an innocent spouse, and embracing the more pragmatic view that
marital failure results from complex spousal dynamics beyond the understanding and the
appropriate inquiry of a court. No-fault reforms thus made divorce available simply upon a
showing that the marriage is "irretrievably broken." See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
ACT § 305 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 242 (1998). From the proposition that no one should
be blamed for the marriage breakdown, came the correlate that each divorcing spouse is
entitled to a fresh start and a clean break. In principle, no-fault divorce thus aims to set each
spouse free to begin life anew, free from any lingering emotional or financial entanglement
with a former mate. See Starnes, Mothers as Suckers, supra note 9, at 1538-40.
46. See supra note 9.
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that parents who serve as primary caretakers after divorce, most often mothers,47
will disproportionately bear the immediate and long-term opportunity costs
associated with post-divorce childcare.48
Rethinking family law to more equitably address families with children
begins with an understanding of the financial tools currently available to divorce
courts. These tools come in "three little boxes"-property, alimony, and child
support.4 9 Each tool aims to transform a married couple into two separate
individuals, i.e., to settle interspousal economic rights and responsibilities and
terminate the parties' ties as completely as possible. Although the presence of
minor children complicates this aspirational disentanglement, even the law of child
support remains as true to clean-break myths as possible, viewing divorcing
parents as individual parents and assigning, in separate, more or less tidy packages,
each parent's responsibility for support of the child. Of the three financial tools
available to divorce courts, laws governing the distribution of marital property are
perhaps the most ill-equipped to ensure economic equity between divorcing
parents.
47. Despite the supposed abandonment of gender-biased custody
decisionmaking, mothers are far more likely than fathers to have primary physical custody
of children. "Many studies show that around 90 percent of custodial parents are mothers,"
although this figure may be dropping somewhat. Ira Mark Ellman, Sanford Braver & Robert
J. MacCoun, Intuitive Lawmaking: The Example of Child Support, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 69, 70 n.1 (2009). In one widely cited study, researchers found that in 70% of the
cases, children of divorced parents resided primarily with their mothers. See Robert H.
Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child Custody, 10 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 54, 57 (2002). The U.S. Census Bureau reports that children who live with only
one parent are five times more likely to live with their mother than with their father. JASON
FIELDS, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P20-547, CHILDREN'S
LIvING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 2 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf.
48. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.04 cmt. i ("Bearing primary
responsibility for a child additionally constrains the residential parent's labor-force
opportunities after dissolution."). At worst, the post-divorce costs of juggling paid work and
childrearing may plunge a divorced caretaker into bankruptcy. Divorced mothers are three
times more likely to file for bankruptcy than childless women. Elizabeth Warren, Families
Alone: The Changing Economics ofRearing Children, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 551, 552 (2005).
49. See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 383, 396-402 (1994). At first blush, distinguishing among these awards seems simple
enough: Property distribution is a one-time split of existing rights; alimony is an order to
make periodic payments out of future income to support an ex-spouse; child support is an
order to make periodic payments out of future income to support a child. As a practical
matter, however, these distinctions sometimes blur. A property award, for example, is
sometimes paid over time; alimony is sometimes paid in a lump sum; child support benefits
not only the child, but also, incidentally, the ex-spouse who cares for her. However difficult
the process may be, attaching a label to a financial award may have important tax,
bankruptcy, and modification consequences. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(15), 1325(a),
1328(a) (2006); HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS 976-83 (6th ed. 2007).
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A. Property Distribution: "Nothing from Nothing Leaves Nothing",5 0
As part of the process of severing spousal ties, the property distribution
generally aims to assign an equitable share of marital property to each individual
spouse. The property order is ordinarily a one-time, non-modifiable judgment that
finally settles the spouses' property rights.
While no-fault did not originate this property scheme, no-fault offers an
interesting justification for it. As the drafters of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act ("UMDA") explain: "The distribution of property upon the termination of a
marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets
incident to the dissolution of a partnership."5' Property distribution is thus cast as
part of the process of winding up the marital partnership,52 a process during which
"partnership assets and liabilities are determined, debts owed the partnership are
collected, and (in the usual case) partnership property is sold and the proceeds of
the sale applied to the partnership debts." 3 After completion of any unfinished
partnership business, the partnership terminates,54  the spouses' financial
entanglement ends, and each spouse walks away with a clean break and a fresh
start. This partnership analogy for property distribution has endured, and the basic
process for dividing property has not much changed since the early days of no-
fault.
Absent an enforceable agreement between the spouses settling property
issues,55 the divorce court must identify, 56 value, 57 and distribute all available
50. BILLY PRESTON, Nothing from Nothing, on NOTHING FROM NOTHING (A&M
Records 1974).
51. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), Prefatory Note, 9A
U.L.A. 161 (1998).
52. "Dissolution" is not synonymous with "termination" in partnership law. To
put termination in perspective, dissociation of a partner usually triggers dissolution of the
partnership; upon dissolution, "the partnership entity enters a new phase-winding up, often
referred to as liquidation-which ends with termination of the partnership." See ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.01(b), at
7:5 to 7:8 (1988 & 2008 Supp.); see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 30, 6 U.L.A. 354 (2001)
("On dissolution the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed.").
53. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 52, § 7.10(a), at 7:142.8.
54. See id. For a discussion of the termination of the marital partnership, see
infra Part IV.A.
55. Most often divorcing parties agree to the distribution of property either in a
settlement agreement or, less commonly, in a prenuptial agreement. Robert Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhausert discuss this point in their seminal article on divorce agreements. Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 n.3 (1979) (estimating that less than 10% of divorces are
litigated). Rules for property distribution thus operate as default rules that are triggered by
divorcing parties' failure to reach an agreement on this economic consequence of divorce.
56. Most states authorize courts to distribute marital property, but not the
separate property of either spouse. Marital property is the common law analog to
community property, which is generally all property acquired during marriage by either
spouse except by gift or inheritance. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("Property owned
before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift, will, or inheritance is separate
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property. All common law states and most community property states give trial
courts broad discretion to distribute property "equitably."58 "Equitable" simply
means "fair," which is not necessarily "equal." Typically, state statutes provide a
list of non-exclusive, relevant factors to guide judicial decisionmaking, but
ultimately leave the determination of what is fair to the courts. 59 Neither a range of
choice nor a suggested weight for the various factors is specified, affording courts
broad discretion to determine equity on a case-by-case basis.
As the ALI has observed, property decisionmaking is complicated by the
fact that equitable-distribution factors tend to reflect two conflicting principles:
first, that property should be allocated according to spousal need, and second, that
property should be allocated according to spousal contribution to its acquisition.so
An emphasis on contribution will support a larger award for a primary
breadwinner, while an emphasis on need will support a larger award for the
primary homemaker, who is likely to be less financially well positioned at divorce.
Should contribution trump need or vice versa? Equitable distribution statutes offer
no answer to this question, exacerbating the difficulties inherent in the already
challenging process of achieving equity.
property."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3501 (2011) (defining marital property as "all property
acquired by either party during the marriage"). Because marital property and community
property are similar (although not identical) concepts, and for simplicity's sake, this Article
uses the phrase "marital property" to refer to property that is distributable at divorce in
either a common law or a community property state.
A minority of states do not distinguish between marital and separate property, instead
authorizing courts to distribute any property owned by either or both spouses at divorce. See
J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 3.03
(2005).
57. States disagree on the important question of when valuation should occur.
Property may be valued as of the date of separation, the date of trial, the date of the final
decree, or left to the discretion of the trial court. For a comparison of differing state
approaches to valuation dates, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 4.03 Reporter's Notes
cmts. e-f.
58. See id. § 4.03 cmt. a.
59. The UMDA, for example, directs courts to consider:
The duration of the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount
and source of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities,
and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the
appointment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 [Alternative A] (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 288
(1998). The court must also consider "the contribution or dissipation of each party in the
acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and
the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." Id.
60. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 4.09 cmt. a. Some statutes reference the
contributions of homemakers in their laundry list of relevant factors. While such references
initially appear to value a homemaker's non-financial contributions to the marriage, a closer
reading sometimes suggests that relevant homemaker contributions are those linked to the
acquisition of assets. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(7) (2011) (authorizing court to
consider the "contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as
homemaker").
HeinOnline  -- 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 210 2012
LOVERS, PARENTS, AND PARTNERS
In an effort to provide more guidance and make property distribution
more consistent and predictable, some states recognize starting points or
presumptions that an equitable distribution is an equal one.' Perhaps this is
because, "[a]s any group of schoolchildren dividing a bag of candy know, the
default meaning of fair is 'equal."'62 An equal division of property is also
consistent with partnership default rules.63
Good intentions notwithstanding, the clean-break property distribution
scheme has not worked well, primarily because most divorcing couples do not
have enough property to give a court much to work with. In 2002, the median net
worth of married couples in the United States was $101,975, but when home
equity was excluded, net worth was only $24,950.64 In today's economy, divorcing
spouses are even more likely to have minimal or no property, and perhaps more
debts than assets. Simply put, no matter how well crafted the property distribution
tools, an empty property pot gives a court nothing to work with.
Even when property abounds, the property distribution is an awkward
tool for dealing with the post-divorce costs of parenting. Although a sizable,
disparately large share of marital property could offset the costs of post-divorce
primary caretaking, these costs are difficult to estimate. Because property awards
are not modifiable, an award intended to address co-parenting responsibilities
might lock parents into obligations that are inappropriately large or inappropriately
small. Moreover, there is no satisfactory theoretical basis for conscripting the
property distribution to address the costs of post-divorce caretaking. Property rules
were designed to bring an equitable conclusion to the marital partnership, which
exists quite apart from any continuing co-parenting obligations, and the
partnership analogy strongly supports an equal-division rule. In the end, property
distribution is an unsatisfactory tool for addressing the parents' shared
responsibility for the post-divorce costs of parenting. Perhaps alimony can do
better.
B. Alimony: Aiding Victims of Marriage
Alimony has long been a conceptual mystery, for there is no dependable
answer to the question of why anyone should be forced to share income with a
former spouse.65 In the days before absolute divorce, the conceptual basis for
61. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-15-7-5 (2011) (directing courts to "presume that an
equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable").
62. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 336 (5th
ed. 2010).
63. In the absence of an agreement otherwise, partners share profits and losses
equally. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 101 (2001).
64. ALFRED 0. GOTTSCHALCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P70-115, NET WORTH AND THE ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS: 2002, at 15 fig.8
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-115.pdf. For a discussion of
the limited property available in most marriages, see DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 468-69 (2d ed. 2009).
65. Alimony has many names-maintenance, spousal support, compensatory
spousal payments. This Article will use the most familiar term-"alimony." Alimony comes
in many forms. Its term may be fixed or indefinite; it may be for a specified purpose such as
2112012]1
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alimony was plain enough: A husband undertook a lifetime obligation to support
his wife.66 Although he might receive a separation from bed and board (mensa et
thoro), he could not entirely sever the marital tie.6 7 Marriage was for life, and
alimony was the judicial tool for enforcing the husbandly duty of support during
spousal separation. Since the advent of absolute divorce, however, the justification
68for alimony has been elusive. Numerous commentators have sought rationales in
analogies to contract principles of reliance, restitution, and expectation,69 and to
70 71 .72tort, secured transactions, insurance, severance pay or unemployment
benefits,7 3 and partnership. 74 In 2002, the ALI offered its own rationale, which it
labeled a principal innovation, suggesting that alimony be viewed as the allocation
of loss caused by marital failure. 75
Alimony may have no obvious rationale, but it has an obvious trigger.
The no-fault key to alimony eligibility and also to alimony quantification is need. 6
a recipient's rehabilitation or reimbursement for contributions to the other spouse's
education or training. This Article uses the term "alimony" to refer loosely to all these
forms of income sharing. For a description of the types of alimony based on purpose and
duration, see ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 557-59.
66. Today, alimony cannot be limited to women only. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 278-83 (1979) (striking down an Alabama alimony statute that expressly limited
alimony to wives).
67. For a review of early divorce laws in the United States by region, see Ann
Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 381, 383-84 (2007).
68. For a review of alimony rationales over time, see Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-
Thinking Alimony: The AAML's Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support
or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 61, 62, 65-73 (2008).
69. For a review of alimony rationales based on analogies to contract remedies,
see Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2011).
70. See Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1991).
71. See Ertman, supra note 9.
72. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1272-73 (1998).
73. See RICHARD A.POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 153 (6th ed. 2003).
74. See Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9, at 71-72;
Starnes, Mothers as Suckers, supra note 9, at 1535-38.
75. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 5.02 cmt. a. The basis for alimony,
reasons the Institute, is "disproportionate vulnerability to the financial consequences of
divorce." Id § 5.05 cmt. e. Such disparate economic vulnerability may result from one
spouse's economic dependence on the other spouse, which increases over the duration of a
long marriage, id. § 5.04 cmt. c, or from caretaking responsibilities that cause an earning-
capacity loss, id. § 5.05 cmt. a. The ALI notes that "wives continue, in the great majority of
cases, to sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for their children, in reliance upon
continued market labor by their husbands." Id. § 5.05 Reporter's Notes cmt. c. The ALI
renames alimony "compensatory spousal payments." Id. § 5.01 cmt. a. Although the ALI
alimony model recognizes the costs of caretaking, its focus is on past caretaking. See id. §
5.05.
76. Section 308(a) of the UMDA, for example, authorizes a court to grant
alimony to a claimant who (1) "lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable
needs" and (2) "is unable to support himself through appropriate employment." UNIF.
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"Need," however, has no consistent definition.7 7 Courts are given broad discretion
to define "need" narrowly or broadly, to decide whether to award alimony,7 8 and to
determine the appropriate value and duration of any alimony award. State
alimony statutes typically offer guidance in the form of laundry lists of non-
exclusive relevant factors,80 but ultimate decisions about alimony are left to an
individual judge's sense of fair play. The broad judicial discretion that defines
alimony, the absence of a satisfactory rationale, and the varying definitions of
"need" have combined to produce an alimony regime that is marked by
unpredictability, inconsistency, and confusion.
Some jurisdictions have responded to these problems by endorsing
alimony guidelines, but the guidelines themselves raise troubling questions about
the underlying basis for the numbers populating them. Without a rationale for
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308(a) (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998). Subsection
(a)(2) continues: "[T]he custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." Id. §
308(a)(2). This language may warrant alimony for a claimant who is caring for a special-
needs child.
77. Efforts to choose among the many possible definitions of need are
confounded by the absence of any agreed-upon rationale for alimony. See ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 10, at ch. 1, topic 1, gen. materials 25 ("'[N]eed' is often used in the law as a
conclusory term whose only meaning is that a court has found the spouse entitled to an
award of alimony.").
78. Like most states, the UMDA authorizes, but does not require, a court to grant
alimony to a needy claimant. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308(a) [Alternative A]
(amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 288 (1998) ("[Tlhe court may grant a maintenance order for
either spouse only if ..... (emphasis added)).
79. The UMDA, for example, provides that the "maintenance order shall be in
amounts and for periods of time the court deems just." Id. § 308(b).
80. The UMDA lists six relevant factors:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs
independently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a
child living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(3) the standard of living during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Id. Some states offer longer lists. The New Jersey equitable-distribution statute, for
example, lists 12 factors relevant to alimony decisionmaking, plus a 13th catch-all factor:
"Any other factors which the court may deem relevant." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23(b)
(2011). Michigan follows a similar statutory scheme. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 (2011).
81. See Kisthardt, supra note 68, at 73-74.
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alimony it is difficult to justify the choice of determinative factors and
mathematical formulae that drive the guideline numbers. 82
If alimony is a problematic tool, it is a rarely used tool. The vast majority
of alimony recipients are women, but notwithstanding popular perceptions to the
contrary, few women receive alimony. The ALI puts the number at fewer than
20%.83 The paucity of alimony awards no doubt stems from alimony's terrible
reputation,84 its inconsistency with contemporary norms applauding self-
sufficiency and individualism,s definitions of "need" that exclude claimants who
can avoid poverty, and also clean-break myths. The clean-break goal is clearly
expressed in the UMDA's recommendation that courts address financial inequities
at divorce through the distribution of property rather than through alimony.8 6 If
82. On alimony guidelines in general, see Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law
ofDivorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 Fam. L.Q. 801 (1999).
83. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 5.04 cmt. a. The incidence of alimony
is typically reported in terms of the percentage of divorced women who are receiving it. See
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 422 (gathering U.S. Census Bureau data showing that in
2006 there were 9,621,000 divorced women age 18 or older; among persons (male or
female) 15 years or older, only 382,000 were receiving alimony); GORDON H. LESTER, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P60-173, CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1989, at 13 tbl.K. (1991), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/
p60-173.pdf (reporting that about 14% of divorced women reported receiving alimony
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, while about 17% reported receiving alimony in
1987).
One study of expectations found that although 80% of women assumed they would
receive alimony if they divorced, in fact only about 8% of women were being awarded
alimony. See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 122.
84. As one court explained the demeaning nature of alimony: "In recent years,
courts have retreated from traditional attitudes toward spousal support because society no
longer perceives the married woman as an economically unproductive creature who is
'something better than her husband's dog, a little dearer than his horse."' Otis v. Otis, 299
N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Nancy A. Veith, Rehabilitative Spousal Support:
In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.
L. REv. 493, 494-95 (1978) (footnote omitted)).
85. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career
Assets: The Ascendency of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REv. 59, 61-64
(2001); see also Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and
Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 505 (noting the rise of psychologic man and the
diminution of moral discourse in family law).
86. The official comment to UMDA § 308 provides:
The dual intention of this section and section 307 is to encourage the
court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by property
disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the available
property is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks
maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills and
interests or is occupied with child care may an award of maintenance be
ordered.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 cmt. (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 447 (1998).
While this official comment seems to support alimony for primary caretakers, the actual text
of section 308 is more restrictive, authorizing maintenance for a spouse who is "the
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alimony is necessary, clean-break myths teach that it should be for the short, fixed
term required to rehabilitate a needy spouse.
Like the property distribution, alimony focuses on spousal commitments
rather than co-parenting commitments. To be sure, if primary caretaking during
marriage has already reduced a caretaker's earning potential at the time of divorce,
she may qualify for alimony on the ground that she is needy. But as cases on
income imputation demonstrate, courts tend to frown on divorced caretakers who
are under-employed.88 If the daily demands of post-divorce primary caretaking
compromise the caretaker's employment opportunities, as they often do,89 alimony
generally leaves these costs where they fall-usually on mothers.
On balance, alimony is doing a poor job of the work assigned to it. I have
proposed a new alimony regime based on an analogy to partnership buyouts,
which would offer a rationale for alimony, a predictable quantification model, and
a more equitable conclusion to marital partnerships. 90 But it would be a mistake to
conscript alimony for work beyond its intended purpose. Fundamentally, alimony
is a tool for ensuring equitable termination of the parties' relationship as spouses;
it does not attempt to address divorced spouses' continuing relationship as co-
parents. For divorcing parents with children, something beyond alimony is
required. Perhaps the law of child support offers a better tool for addressing the
costs of post-divorce parenting.
C. Child Support: The Law of Single Parents
The charge that default rules governing the economics of divorce do not
achieve equity between spouses is largely an indictment of laws governing
termination of the marital partnership, namely property distribution and alimony.
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian
not be required to seek employment outside the home." Id. § 308(a).
87. For a look at the rehabilitation illusion in early no-fault law, see Starnes,
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9., at 97-99.
88. Unless they are caring for disabled children or perhaps for very young
children, alimony claimants whose earnings are reduced because of post-divorce caretaking
may be targets of income imputation. Income imputation serves to reduce the size of an
alimony award, and may even disqualify a claimant from receiving alimony, effectively
punishing the custodian for "excessive" caretaking. For a review and critique of state laws
governing imputation of income to caretakers, see Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers, Myths,
and the Law of Divorce: One More Feminist Case for Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 203, 227-30 (2006). For a list of alimony statutes that include references to
custodial responsibility, see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law 2007-2008: Federalization and Nationalization Continue, 42 FAM. L.Q. 713,
757 tbl. 1 (2009).
89. As the ALI recognizes, "when the parent already handicapped in the market
by prior provision of child care assumes at dissolution primary responsibility for the care of
the child, there is effectively a second handicapping of that parent's potential for gainful
earnings." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.04 cmt. i.
90. For a brief summary of this proposal, see infra Part IV.A. For additional
discussion, see Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9, at 130-38.
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But laws governing child support create new inequities, furthering clean-break
goals in ways that penalize primary caretakers.
The story of child support begins with the long-recognized duty of
parents to provide for their children.9 ' When parents are married, the law assumes
they will act in their children's best interests and so defers to parental
decisionmaking absent evidence of abuse or neglect. At divorce, however, the law
is less willing to rely on parental goodwill, routinely intervening to ensure that
divorced parents adequately provide for their children. 92 Until the 1980s,
individual divorce courts were vested with broad discretion to fix appropriate
amounts of child support on a case-by-case basis.93 This broad discretionary
system was repeatedly criticized for its tendency to produce inconsistent,
unpredictable, and inequitable child support awards.94 In the 1980s, calls for
reform culminated in the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, which
required states to adopt discretionary child support guidelines. In 1988, as a
condition to receipt of federal funding for designated child-welfare programs,
Congress mandated that these guidelines operate as rebuttable presumptions.9 6
Federal legislation requires states to reexamine their guideline numbers at least
once every four years.97 While all states now have child support guidelines, the
methodology used to calculate the guideline numbers, and consequently the
numbers themselves, vary from state to state.
91. As Blackstone observed:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law.. . . By begetting them, therefore, they have
entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies,
that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *435.
92. Most divorces are settled by agreement of the parties; these agreements
typically contain provisions for child support. At least in theory, however, the divorce court
will review the child support figure to ensure its adequacy. See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL.,
FAMILY LAw 718 (4th ed. 2010) ("[T]raditionally, and still officially in some states, parties
may not enter into binding contracts with regard to support, custody, and visitation that tie
the hands of the court.").
93. See Ellman et al., supra note 47, at 70.
94. Observers were concerned that this discretionary system tended to set child
support awards at unrealistic levels-sometimes too low, sometimes too high-and failed to
reasonably consider both the child and the paying parent's ability to pay. See S. REP. No.
387, at 40 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2436.
95. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378,
98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
96. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2343
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Any deviation from a guideline
amount must be supported by specific findings that "state the amount of support that would
have been required under the guidelines and include a justification of why the order varies
from the guidelines." 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2011).
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(e), (h) (2011).
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Most states quantify child support under either an income shares or a
percentage of obligor income ("POOL") formula.98 The income shares model is
based on a simple principle known as "continuity of expenditure"-the tenet that
spending on children after divorce should replicate amounts spent on children
during marriage.99 To achieve this goal, income shares models calculate the
parents' combined incomes, multiply this figure by a percentage based on income
level, and then assign each parent a pro rata share of the total.10 0 In most states, the
percentage multiplier decreases as parental income increases, so that parents at the
highest income levels pay the smallest percentage of their total income as child
support. 0 1
In a simpler approach, the POOI model focuses only on the non-custodial
parent's income, multiplying that figure by a designated percentage that varies
according to the number of children. 0 2 Both the income shares and the POOI
models assume the custodial parent will provide financial support for the child
with whom she lives, so the child support award reflects only the non-custodial
parent's financial responsibility.
Neither quantification model is without its critics. Commentators have
charged that guideline awards are sometimes too low 0 3 and sometimes too high,104
98. About two-thirds of the states use an income shares model; 13 states use a
POOI model; 3 states use the "Melson formula," named after the Delaware Family Court
Judge who developed it; and 2 states use hybrids of the POOI and Melson formulae.
ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 605-07.
99. See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O'Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support,
45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 116 (2008). As Ellman and Ellman rightly note, however,
"unless their two incomes rise, the two post-separation households cannot both achieve the
same living standard as the single pre-separation household." Id.
100. The income shares model requires three steps: (1) combine the parents'
incomes; (2) determine an appropriate level of child support based on the parents' combined
incomes; and (3) pro-rate the total amount of child support between the parents in
proportion to each parent's income,
101. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 605.
102. Id. at 606. For a helpful description of child-support quantification models,
see Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21 FAM.
L.Q. 281, 287-93, 295 (1987).
103. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 222 (2000) ("Strong
evidence demonstrates that even if.. . all support were paid, the support would be
inadequate to meet the needs of children."); ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 532-33
(stating that the committee charged with examining Arizona's "not atypical" income shares
guidelines concluded that "[i]f the custodial parent is poor, the custodial household remains
poor even when the support obligor's income is high"); Barbara Stark, Promo Parenting, 80
OR. L. REv. 1035, 1061 (2001) (reviewing DOWD, supra) ("[E]ven if child support is paid, it
is usually inadequate.").
104. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 525 (stating that typical income shares
guidelines yield "lower support amounts for the upper half of the income distribution, and
higher amounts for the lower half, than accurate data would justify"); see also id. at 532-33
(noting that the committee charged with examining Arizona's "not atypical" income shares
guidelines concluded that "[1]ow-income obligors are expected to pay unreasonably high
support amounts to high-income custodial parents").
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fail to reduce childhood poverty satisfactorily, 0 5 ignore economies of scale,1 0 6 and
tend to perpetuate differences in household standards of living.10 7 Child-support
quantification formulae are also flawed for their failure to recognize that each
divorced parent has a responsibility not only to the child, but also to the other
parent.
In ways that may not be immediately apparent, child support models aim
to disentangle divorcing parents. True to clean-break myths, child support awards
seek to identify, separate, and assign each parent's individual liability for the child.
The premise is that each parent owes an individual responsibility to the child,
which must be measured, but that the parents have no continuing obligation to
each other, and thus owe each other no financial support. Even under income
shares models, which combine the parents' incomes to determine support levels,
the goal of child support is essentially to convert what was once shared family
responsibility for children into the individual responsibilities of two "single"
parents. Calculation of child support thus recognizes no continuing obligations
between parents, but only between each parent individually and the child.
The clean-break goal of child support and the sense of individual
entitlement it fosters are evident in the frequent complaint of non-custodial fathers
that their child support payments are benefitting the custodial mother, an event that
is assumed to be inappropriate. 08 As the ALI observed, "[T]he payor parent has an
interest in limiting the measure of his child support obligation to his relationship to
the child, rather than to the residential household."109 Of course, it is not possible
to fully protect this interest, legitimate or not, because, as the ALI observes, "any
transfer of income to the child's residential household may also be enjoyed by
other members of the household, including the residential parent. This is an
inevitable and unavoidable effect of any child support transfer, and is not itself an
adequate reason for limiting or disapproving child support." 10 Sharing with a co-
parent is thus cast as an unfortunate but unavoidable price of supporting one's
child.
105. Leslie Joan Harris, The ALI Child Support Principles: Incremental Changes
to Improve the Lot of Children and Residential Parents, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 245,
247-48 (2001).
106. Leslie Joan Harris, The Proposed ALI Child Support Principles, 35
WILLAMETTEL. REv. 717, 727-33 (1999).
107. Id.; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at ch. 1, topic 1, gen. materials
19 ("[G]uidelines ... generally do not produce satisfactory results when the child's parents
have substantially unequal incomes.").
108. The payor's complaint sometimes takes the form of a charge that his child
support payments are actually "disguised additional maintenance." See, e.g., Smith v.
Stewart, 684 A.2d 265, 269 (Vt. 1996) (noting that while "increased child support
necessarily has an incidental benefit for the custodial parent, the real beneficiaries are the
children" (citations omitted)). In order to guard against a custodian's inappropriate use of
child support on herself, many states authorize courts to order the custodian to provide an
accounting of her spending. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.342 (2011).
109. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.04 cmt. f.
110. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 102, at 287-89 (noting that this reality
makes it difficult to identify an equitable level of child support).
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But why shouldn't the non-custodial parent share income with the co-
parent who is caring for shared children on a daily basis? Whether she is a full-
time Betty Crocker, a Gapper, or a primary caretaker who works two shifts, if the
custodial parent experiences opportunity costs as a result of post-divorce
caretaking, 1 ' why should these costs be hers alone to bear? If responsibility for
children's daily physical care is the responsibility of both co-parents, why should
the primary caretaker bear the lion's share of these costs? If a nanny were caring
for their children, the parents would likely share the cost of her salary, but if a
divorced co-parent performs this same daily labor, she is entitled to no
compensation and no reimbursement for her lost market opportunities. At worst,
divorce converts a mother into an unpaid employee of her former husband.
Evidently, when it comes to financial responsibility for children's daily physical
care, the status of a custodial parent is worse than that of a third party stranger.112
Some critics have argued that child support should aim to equalize the
living standards in the two parental households. 113 While such a proposal
represents a welcome shift away from the theoretically dubious and pragmatically
awkward proposition that a parent should share income with a child but not with
the co-parent who primarily cares for her, the proposal's inconsistency with clean-
break myths has ensured that, so far, no state has adopted it. 14
In the end, child support laws, like laws governing property distribution
and alimony, encourage parents to assume divorce should end all commitments
between them. This sense of entitlement, justified by the clean-break myth, lies at
the core of laws governing the economics of divorce. It is, however, strikingly
inconsistent with the emerging law of shared custody.
III. CUSTODY: FROM WINNING TO SHARING
"What's for dinner?" she asks, adding "Dad," as if to remind him
who he is.
Nate finds this question suddenly so mournful that for a moment he
can't answer. It's a question from former times, the olden days. His
Ill. See supra Part I. In many cases, a custodian's earning potential at divorce
will be lower than it would otherwise have been because of primary caretaking undertaken
during marriage. Theoretically at least, alimony should address these opportunity costs
because they were incurred during marriage. See supra Part II.B.
112. For a response to the argument that divorced primary caretakers reap a huge
reward in the form of psychic joy associated with caring for children and so deserve no
additional compensation, see infra Part IV.B.
113. See Judith Cassetty et al., The ELS (Equal Living Standards) Model for Child
Support Awards, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINEs DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC
ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 329 (1986). See generally Marsha Garrison, An
Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 41 (1998); Marsha
Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI Principles
Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (2001).
114. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 92, at 482. The ALI Principles compare the
standard of living of the parents' respective households in order to assess the fairness of
child support. See Harris, supra note 106, at 727-33.
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eyes blur. He wants to drop the casserole on the floor and pick her
up, hug her, but instead he closes the oven door gently.
"Macaroni and cheese, " he says. 1s
Parenthood doesn't end with divorce. Emerging custody models
appreciate the enduring nature of parental status, recognizing that even after
divorce both parents should continue to co-parent their children.116 This
perspective of shared parental rights, however, has not always described custody
law, and child support laws built on traditional custody models have struggled
unsuccessfully to accommodate the contemporary emphasis on shared parenting.
This tension between shared custody and traditional child support suggests a need
to rethink the economics of divorces involving minor children. This rethinking
begins with a brief look at the evolution of custody law.
The custody story begins with the English common law view that
children are property of their fathers." Courts were thought to be justified in
interfering with a father's natural right to custody only in extreme cases of a
father's moral decadence as, for example, where a South Carolina court found a
father had "monstrously and cruelly" abused his power.' 8
American law was not long for English notions of paternal patriarchy," 9
and courts in this country soon began to focus on the well-being of children rather
than the property rights of their parents. This new custody model, known as the
best interest of the child standard, gives trial courts broad discretion to determine
custody-so much discretion that it has been dubbed a regime of judicial
patriarchy.120 Best-interest statutes typically include lists of factors relevant to
custody,121 but ultimately leave the custody decision to individual trial judges who
are thought to be in the best position to weigh the specific facts of each case. The
conceptual appeal of focusing on the child and her well-being has not protected the
best interest standard from critics. Commentators have long charged that this
custody model fosters indeterminacy and unpredictability,122 costly and protracted
115. MARGARET ATWOOD, LIFE BEFORE MAN 10 (1979).
116. As Theresa Glennon observes, "The emerging ideology of post-dissolution
parenting envisions a parenting community of mutual, cooperative engagement in the
parenting process. Through coparenting relationships, whether voluntary or court-ordered,
divorced and separated individuals continue to be closely enmeshed in each others' lives."
Glennon, supra note 4 at 105.
117. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 235-39 (1985). Mothers were "entitled to no power, but
only to reverence and respect." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, at *441.
118. See GROSSBERG, supra note 117, at 237.
119. See id. at 237-38.
120. See id.
121. See supra note 80.
122. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language,
and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988); Mary
Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1181 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 262
(1975).
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litigation,123 and reliance on a judge's personal moral code.124 One critic suggests
coin-flipping might be a better alternative.125
Traditional best-interest decisionmaking is based on the premise that a
judge must choose one parent to serve as the child's custodian. The proposition
that children are better off with only one, clearly identified custodian is grounded
in the psychological literature on attachment theory and on the concept of the
"psychological parent"-the single adult who is most important to the child.126
Traditional custody litigation thus involves a zero-sum game in which each parent
claims to be better for the child, and each parent is tempted to establish his or her
own superiority by attacking the competency of the other. The winner of this
competition takes the prize-physical custody of the child-and the loser must
settle for modest visitation rights. Although much is at stake in the custody contest,
there is often no clear answer to the question of which parent is better for the child,
or will be better for the child in the years following divorce.127
The difficulty of best-interests decisionmaking has led some courts to rely
on heuristics that serve as proxies for the child's best interests. These heuristics
may operate as presumptions, starting points, or simply as tie-breakers. Under one
influential sex-based heuristic, which became known as the tender-years doctrine,
infants were presumed to be best placed with their mothers, and older children
with the parent of the same sex. 128 The tender-years doctrine dominated custody
decisionmaking throughout much of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, coincident
with the women's movement, critics began to challenge the gender-based
stereotype underpinning the doctrine.129 Attacks on the constitutionality of the
123. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 122, at 262.
124. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 2.02 cmt. c ("When the only guidance
for the court is what best serves the child's interests, the court must rely on its own value
judgments. . . .").
125. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 122, at 289-90.
126. Most influentially, this view was promoted by Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert J. Solnit. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 53, 98 (1973).
A "single" parent custodian was thought to be important to help the child avoid confusion
and maintain a sense of security and stability. For a critique of this view, see Peggy Cooper
Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 347, 347-50 (1996).
127. As the ALI Principles note, the best-interests test "tells courts to do what is
best for a child, as if what is best can be determined and is within their power to achieve."
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 2.
128. For insight into the tender years doctrine, see Martha L. Fineman & Anne
Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at
Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 112-13.
129. See Kathleen Nemechek, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions:
Where We Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REv. 437,
440 (1998). Critics of a maternal preference have charged that it sends a message that
"taking care of children is a woman's job." Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the
Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 10 (1987). Martha Fineman however, has
argued that recognition of women's continuing role as primary caretakers ought to be a
significant factor in custody decisionmaking. See Fineman, supra note 122, at 768-69.
HeinOnline  -- 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 221 2012
222 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:197
tender-years presumption ultimately led to its rejection in all 50 states.!30 Today,
some critics charge that sex-based heuristics survive in the form of a preference for
the children's primary caretaker, who most often is the mother.1 3 1
A. Sharing Children
The last two decades have seen a dramatic challenge to the fundamental
tenet that courts must choose between two fit parents and award sole custody to the
superior parent. In the 1980s, courts and legislatures increasingly embraced the
revolutionary concept of joint custody.' 32 The notion that parents could share
custody had great appeal to a variety of parties. Judges could avoid the difficult
task of choosing between two fit parents, family law could reduce or eliminate the
acrimony inspired by the traditional winner/loser custody model, both parents
would be respected and encouraged to spend significant time with their children,' 33
and children would benefit from the continuing involvement of both parents. 134
The joint custody movement caught fire. One commentator described joint or
shared custody as "the most politically attractive concept of the 1990s." 35 By
1989, 34 states had enacted joint-custody statutes of some type.' 3 6 But the type of
130. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges' Accounts of
the Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 769, 774 (2004). Some courts consider a
child's tender years as one relevant factor. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the
Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 337 (2008).
131. For criticism of the primary caretaker preference, see Mary Becker, Maternal
Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 201-
02 (1992) (arguing that this preference disadvantages women and encourages courts to give
too much weight to the smaller contributions of fathers); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 533 (1984)
(criticizing the preference because it "exaggerates the importance of the bond to the
primary-caretaker parent in comparison to the bond with the other parent").
132. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 455, 455 (1984) (describing joint custody as a "small revolution").
133. Advocates say joint physical custody can encourage continued involvement
of both parents in children's lives. See Matthew A. Kipp, Maximizing Custody Options:
Abolishing the Presumption Against Joint Physical Custody, 79 N.D. L. REv. 59 (2003);
Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REv. 687 (1985); Stephanie N. Barnes, Comment, Strengthening the
Father-Child Relationship Through a Joint Custody Presumption, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
601 (1999).
134. See Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children's Interests First: Developmentally
Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 98, 100 (2002); Michael T.
Flannery, Is "Bird Nesting" in the Best Interest of Children?, 57 SMU L. REV. 295, 302
(2004).
135. MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE
LEGAL BATTLE-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 40 (1999). As Theresa Glennon
describes the shared parenting campaign: "Through a multitude of media, separating and
divorcing parents are exhorted to put aside their differences in order to effectively
'coparent' their children." Glennon, supra note 4, at 113.
136. Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 467 (1989).
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joint custody intended by legislators and other legal actors is not always clear.
"Joint custody" may refer either to joint legal custody, which gives parents shared
authority to make important decisions for the child,'3 7 or to joint physical custody,
which gives parents relatively equal time with the child.138 Failure to identify the
form of joint custody at issue has injected much confusion into the conversation.
Joint legal custody does appear to be more widespread than its more controversial
cousin, joint physical custody.1 39
Although joint custody has much conceptual appeal, it also has many
critics.10 Among other things, commentators have challenged the social science
research offered in support of joint custody, 4 1 the basic proposition that joint
custody is more beneficial to children than traditional custody models,142 and the
"equalitarianism" rhetoric that obscures recognition of the special relationship
between mothers and children. 143 Critics also stress that in cases involving high
conflict between parents, children do not benefit from continuing contact with both
parents, and that joint custody may force women to cooperate with a physically
violent former spouse.144 Despite its critics, the notion that children generally
137. In Iowa, for example, "legal custody" includes a right to "decision making
affecting the child's legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and
religious instruction." IOWA CODE § 598.1(3), (5) (2011). For a helpful discussion of the
distinctions between joint legal and joint physical custody, see In re Marriage of Hansen,
733 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 2007).
138. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 671. Joint physical custody does not
invariably require an equal split of the child's time. See Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty
Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (2006);
David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1461, 1471 n.51 (2006).
139. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 675 (describing a California study that
so found); see also Catherine R. Albiston, Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert R. Mnookin, Does
Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 167, 167 (1990).
140. See, e.g., Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological
Perspective on Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 419, 438-39
(2008); Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV.
497, 507 (1988); Cynthia C. Siebel, Fathers and Their Children: Legal and Psychological
Issues ofJoint Custody, 40 FAM. L.Q. 213, 222-25 (2006).
141. See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise,
and Experts in the Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 843, 850 (2000).
142. See, e.g., Stephen Gilmore, Contact/Shared Residence and Child Well-Being:
Research Evidence and Its Implications for Legal Decision-Making, 20 INT'L J.L. POL'Y &
FAM. 344, 352-53 (2006). Some research suggests that "surprisingly, even a fairly small
amount of contact seemed to be sufficient to maintain close relationships, at least as these
relationships were seen from the adolescents' perspective." Eleanor E. Maccoby et al.,
Postdivorce Roles of Mothers and Fathers in the Lives of Their Children, 7 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 24, 32-33 (1993); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 92, at 618 (noting that
studies show benefits to children did not depend on the quantity of contract or form of the
award but rather primarily on the quality of interaction between the parents themselves and
also between parent and child).
143. See Fineman, supra note 122, at 734-35, 768-69.
144. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 682.
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benefit from shared-custody arrangements continues to greatly influence legal
thinking, recently prompting the ALI to advance a new form of shared custody.
The ALI version of shared custody represents a substantial improvement
over early joint-custody models. Under the ALI's approximation model, courts
would allocate custodial responsibility after divorce in a manner that quantitatively
approximates each parent's share of childcare prior to divorce.145 If, for example,
parents shared childcare equally during marriage, the custody arrangement after
divorce would resemble joint physical custody; in other cases, custody orders
would represent points on a continuum of residential responsibility. First proposed
by Professor Elizabeth Scott,146 the approximation model seeks to minimize
disruption for the child by perpetuating previously established patterns of parental
care and to reduce conflict between parents by deferring to the parents' childcare
arrangement during marriage.147 In another improvement over the best interest
model, the approximation model would increase the predictability of custody
outcomes by focusing judicial inquiry on historical facts rather than indeterminate
predictions about the future.' 48
The ALI's approximation model encourages a new way of thinking about
post-divorce parental responsibility. Rejecting the sole-custodian, winner-take-all
traditional model, the ALI advances a vision of continued, shared parenting that
respects and protects each spouse's status as a parent, no matter that the parents are
divorced. This vision nudges parents toward an expectation that while divorce may
end their status as spouses, it will not end their status as co-parents. Consistent
with this vision of parenting, the ALI urges abandonment of traditional
terminology such as "custodian" and "visitor"-hierarchical categories that
suggest a zero-sum game 49 and so tend to increase acrimony between parents. The
ALI suggests an alternative vocabulary that avoids bipolar labels, speaking instead
of each parent's relative share of residential responsibility, which is set out in an
agreed-upon parenting plan.t5 o
145. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 2.08(1) ("Unless otherwise resolved by
agreement of the parents... the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents'
separation."). The ALI recommends a rebuttable presumption in favor of joint legal custody.
Id. § 2.09.
146. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody,
80 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1992).
147. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 2.08 cmt. b (indicating that approximation
rules yield more predictable results than the best-interest test).
148. Id. Of course, even "historical facts" may be difficult to determine,
especially in an acrimonious divorce. Parents may disagree, for example, over how many
hours each spent caring for a child-who tucked her into bed and on what days, who fed
and clothed her, helped her with homework, threw her a baseball, read her a story, or talked
with her about her life.
149. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 692-93.
150. Parenting plans are the "cornerstone" of the ALI custody proposal. ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at ch. 1, topic 1, gen. materials 6-8. Details of these plans are
established in section 2.05 of the ALI Principles. See id. § 2.05.
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Like joint physical custody, the ALI approximation model promotes a
view of shared parenting that is strikingly at odds with the traditional custody
model. Because custody and child support are inextricably linked, this shift in
custody perspectives requires a response from laws governing child support.
B. The Economics ofSharing Children: Child Support Footnotes
Child-support guidelines based on the traditional custody model do not
work well with shared parenting. Parents paying child support complain that
current guidelines base support amounts on the traditional assumption that children
will spend only modest amounts of time with non-custodial parents.15' A non-
custodial parent who cares for children for more extended periods will bear a
larger share of the direct costs of childcare than the award contemplates and thus
pay too much in child support.
This complaint has led many states to metaphorically footnote their
traditional child support guidelines, authorizing deviations from presumptive
amounts in order to address equities of shared parenting.152 To this end, states
often invite or require decision-makers to count the number of overnights a child
spends with the parent paying child support.'53 If this number exceeds a specified
threshold, child support is reduced, sometimes exponentially based on a non-
custodian's marginally increased number of overnights with the child, creating a
"cliff effect."1 54
Critics charge that shared-parenting adjustments create new inequities in
child support awards, primarily because many expenses in the primary custodian's
household are fixed and so are not reduced in the child's absence.155 Such
expenses may include a mortgage, rent, a car loan, property taxes, and utilities.
151. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 611.
152. As of 2009, 24 states provided for adjustments in child support based on
shared parenting time. Elrod & Spector, supra note 88, at 759-60 tbl.3.
153. Florida's child support guideline, for example, requires courts to adjust an
award when a custody plan provides that the child spend a "substantial amount of time with
each parent." FLA. STAT. § 61.30(11)(b) (2011). "Substantial" means at least 20% of the
overnights each year. Id. § 61.30( ll)(b)(8). Adjustment is authorized in other cases where
periods of visitation are less than 20% but still significant. Id § 61.30(l l)(a)(10). For a
survey of various state adjustments to child support based on shared parenting, see Jane C.
Venohr & Tracy E. Griffith, Child Support Guidelines: Issues and Reviews, 43 FAM. CT.
REv. 415 (2005). For commentary on shared parenting adjustments, see ABRAMS ET AL.,
supra note 64, at 611 (noting that income shares models generally allow deviations from
guideline amounts where a child spends a substantial period of time with the non-custodial
parent-usually more than 30% of the time); Marygold S. Melli, The American Law
Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting,
25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 347, 359 (2005) (noting that most states reduce child support when the
child spends 20-40% of her overnights with the "lesser-time parent"); Williams, supra note
102, at 293-94 (noting that threshold periods are usually set at 25-30% of a child's time).
154. Melli, supra note 153, at 359 (criticizing the ALI for its failure to offer a
solution to this problem).
155. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 612.
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Shared-parenting adjustments are also criticized for their tendency to
create distorting incentives for parents to improve their respective economic
positioning by altering the child's residential schedule. Lesser-time parents may
thus be tempted to marginally increase the amount of time they spend with the
child in order to reduce child support; primary custodial parents may be tempted to
resist such increases in the child's residency with the other parent in order to avoid
a reduction in child support.' 56 In a worst case scenario, a child's living
arrangement will be the product of the parents' battle to secure economic
advantages rather than of the best interest of the child. Moreover, the critical
question of exactly how much time a child spends with each parent is prone to
promote hostility between parents who are given strong incentives to argue not
only about how much time the child should spend with each parent, but also about
how much time the child actually does spend with each parent. Such a vision is
troubling indeed.
The difficulty of reconciling shared parenting custody models with
traditional child support guidelines is exacerbated by the practical reality that
residential arrangements often change over time. Despite initial intentions to share
physical custody of children more or less equally, custodial arrangements tend to
drift into more traditional patterns. Lesser-time parents tend to visit less;' 57
primary custodial parents, usually mothers, tend to assume a greater share of
children's daily care.' 5 If child support is based on a shared-parenting plan, but
the child actually spends only modest periods with the lesser-time parent, child
support will be set too low, imposing unfair costs on the primary custodial parent,
usually the mother. 5 9
So how can family law equitably address the increasing number of shared
parenting arrangements without imposing unfair costs on the many divorced
parents who drift into traditional custody patterns? How can the law protect
primary caretakers without penalizing parents who share parenting more equally?
Is it possible to protect aspirational visions of shared parenting without imposing
unfair costs on real parents? Clearly, counting days is not the answer.
Resolution of this conundrum begins with recognition of the fundamental
point that the movement from individual entitlement to sharing in custody law is a
departure from clean-break myths that is not yet reflected in laws governing the
economics of divorce. If shared parenting has created challenges for child support
156. See Marygold S. Melli, Guideline Review: Child Support and Time Sharing
By Parents, 33 FAM. L.Q. 219, 229 (1999); see also Robert Scott Merlin, The New Line 11
Visitation Credit: The Non-Custodial Parent Wins While the Child Loses, 55 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 317, 342-43 (1999).
157. Garfinkel et al., supra note 7, at 345.
158. In an older study of two California counties, Eleanor Maccoby and Robert
Mnookin found that dual residence arrangements tended to be unstable. More than half of
the children who initially lived in dual residences or with their fathers had moved into a
different arrangement two years after divorce. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 12, at
167-70.
159. As Professor Martha Fineman warns, an unrealistic vision of shared
parenting may impose substantial costs on primary caretakers by treating "the deviant as the
norm." Fineman, supra note 122, at 734-35, 768-69.
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law, it is because laws governing the economics of divorce are still wed to the
illusion that divorce can and should sever ties between parents. Shared parenting
norms will never fit comfortably into clean-break child support models.
What is needed is a rethinking of the economics of divorces involving
children-something more than a set of footnotes to traditional child support
guidelines. Custody norms recognizing shared parenting rights to access children
should have a counterpart in rules recognizing shared parenting responsibilities for
children's daily physical care. Both parents owe their children more than money. If
child support buys the macaroni and cheese for a child's dinner, someone must
prepare it, wash dinner plates, launder cheese-stained bibs and shirts, and sweep
sticky remnants off the kitchen floor. Children require more than a sum of money
and a pat on the back. If one parent provides the majority of children's daily care,
the other parent should share any opportunity costs the primary caretaker
experiences as a result. The answer to a more realistic, more equitable vision of
shared parental responsibility requires a rethinking of marriages with children.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING MARRIAGES WITH CHILDREN:
A PARTNERSHIP PERSPECTIVE
If a solution to the problem of the divorced primary caretaker has proven
elusive, the explanation lies partly in the continuing influence of traditional visions
of marriage which distort contemporary perceptions of equity in ways that may not
be immediately apparent. The traditional marriage model is based on a
particularized, gender-specific assignment of roles-women provide services; men
provide income.160 Viewed as "favorite"-if subordinate-creatures, married
women were protected by their husbands under the system known as coverture.161
In its heyday, coverture ensured that married women could not contract, hold
property in their names, file suit, or draft willS,162 were subject to corporal
160. Reva Siegel offers a striking example of this traditional view as articulated
by a 1922 Kentucky court: "At common law the husband and wife are under obligation to
each other to perform certain duties. The husband to bring home the bacon, so to speak, and
to furnish a home, while on the wife devolved the duty to keep said home in a habitable
condition." Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994) (quoting Lewis v. Lewis,
245 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1922)).
161. As William Blackstone observed:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything ... and her condition during her marriage is called her
coverture . .. even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the
most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a favourite is
the female sex of the laws of England.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, at *430-33. For a compelling portrayal of coverture and an
argument that despite its supposed abolition, women today are still "disempowered in
marriage and impoverished at divorce," see Siegel, supra note 160, at 2131.
162. See Siegel, supra note 160, at 2127.
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punishment by their husbands,163 and were not accountable for their "inferior
crimes."64 Indeed, married women had no legal existence apart from their
husbands. 165
Even as the system of coverture began to erode, common law property
rules ensured married women's continued dependence on husbands who served as
sole wage-earners. During marriage, common law states base property ownership
on title. A husband who served as sole wage earner, purchasing and titling all
166property in his name, thus held exclusive rights to that property.1 Such a husband
might choose to make a gift to his wife, by, for example, jointly titling property-
but absent such an affirmative step, all property was his alone, generated as it was
by his labor. Family caretaking provided no recognized basis for property rights.
Common law title rules contrast fundamentally with community property
norms which emphasize shared rather than individual income and property. In a
community property state, the labor of either spouse generates property that
belongs to the community rather than to an individual spouse.'67 During marriage,
168
each spouse thus owns an undivided one-half interest in all community property.
Although common law states continue to retain separate-ownership principles
during marriage,' most intervene at divorce to recharacterize property rights
acquired through spousal labor as "marital," a quasi-community property label that
signals availability for equitable distribution. 170 The result is a schizophrenic
understanding of property rights in common law states-during marriage, title is
determinative; at divorce, sharing is suddenly, if briefly, imposed until individual
ownership can once again be established.' 7 1
Taken together, the traditional marriage model and common law title
rules suggest women are entitled to their children and men are entitled to their
wages, i.e., to whatever property their wages can buy.172 Is it possible this vision
163. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, at *442-45 (describing "the old law" under
which a husband could "give his wife moderate correction").
164. Id. at *432 ("[I]n some felonies, and other inferior crimes, committed by her,
through constraint of her husband, the law excuses her: but this extends not to treason or
murder.").
165. Id
166. See ALIPRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at ch. 1, topic 1, gen. materials, 21-23.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Of course, married women can now purchase and hold title to property.
While the dramatic increase in the number of women working outside the home empowers
married women to purchase property, married mothers' continuing role as primary family
caretakers, and the reduction in earnings and earning ability associated with that work,
ensure that many married mothers will have less individual purchasing power than their
husbands. Even today, men may thus continue to benefit more from the common law title
system than women.
170. Id.
171. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 340.
172. For a discussion of stereotypes about mothers and fathers that influence
custody decisions, see Cynthia A. McNeely, Comment, Lagging Behind the Times:
Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 891
(1998).
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continues to influence contemporary expectations? The fact is that divorced
mothers have primary custody of children far more often than men,' 73 and the
clean-break myth insists that, while a divorced father must support his child, his
income should otherwise be his alone. Caring for children, it seems, is women's
work-work that is expected of women and work that is free.1 74 Fathers, on the
other hand, are entitled to their wages and to whatever those wages can buy,
including perhaps a new family.175
Old perspectives are not easily shed. A proposal to require divorced
parents to share income and the costs of parenting must be supported by a
compelling rationale. Identifying such a rationale requires a fresh perspective, a
new lens undistorted by lingering notions of traditional male and female roles,
rights, and responsibilities. An analogy to partnership provides such an
anastigmatic lens.
Partnership is an intuitive metaphor for marriage. Like marriage, a
partnership is a consensual relationship' -one that begins with an expectation
that each partner will personally benefit from the association and that teamwork
will produce benefits greater than those any single member could alone expect. 177
Like spouses, handshake partners often begin their relationship as starry-eyed
optimists eschewing the need for a written agreement, each content to rely on the
other's loyalty, integrity, and commitment to the relationship-or at least
unwilling to question these inclinations in the other-and each hoping and
expecting that the relationship will succeed.
The appeal of a partnership metaphor, however, lies not in the similarities
between marriage and a business partnership, for surely these can be overstated.
The appeal of partnership lies rather in its power to offer a fresh, gender-neutral
perspective on old problems; a vocabulary free of habituated terms that signal and
perpetuate gender-biased assumptions about male and female roles; a rich array of
foundational principles emphasizing mutual contribution, joint responsibility, and
173. See supra note 47.
174. For a discussion of the myth that mothering is free, see Starnes, supra note
88, at 215-24.
175. Under this view, a father's right to enjoy his income trumps any promise he
may have made to share the full costs of childrearing with a co-parent. For a view that
divorce decisionmaking is driven by principles of individual rights rather than shared
responsibilities, see Kelly, supra note 85. For additional discussion, see Schneider, supra
note 85, at 519 (observing a movement in family law away from moral discourse and
toward recognition of individual happiness as paramount).
176. See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs: EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONS 194 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that "the law has always considered a
partnership to be a consensual relationship").
177. As Elizabeth Scott observes, spouses marry because each believes his or her
best prospect for long-term personal happiness lies in a long-term, committed relationship
with the other, i.e., that "individual self-fulfillment will be promoted by a substantial
investment in a stable, interdependent, long-term relationship with a marital partner."
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV.
9, 12 (1990).
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loyalty;'7 and a collection of default rules that assume equality between
partners. 79
Indeed, in an early effort to change thinking about divorce, drafters of the
1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act looked to partnership law. From
partnership came the no-fault principle of divorce at will, the term "dissolution,"
and default rules that provide a useful analogy for the distribution of marital
property at divorce.so A partnership metaphor can offer more-a solution to the
conceptual bind of the primary caretaker. This solution begins with recognition
that married parents are linked to each other on two levels-as marital partners and
as co-parenting partners.
A. The Marital Partnership
Marriage signals a lifetime' 8 commitment 82 between intimate partners who
have exchanged promises, complied with state requirements,' 83 and so acquired the
legal status of spouses. Couples who choose this status are joined in a marital
partnership, a metaphor I have long advanced.184 The marital partnership appears
as:
178. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(a)-(b), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001). A
much-quoted description of the duty of loyalty comes from Justice Cardozo:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
179. See e.g., REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(b), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001)
("Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership profits and is chargeable with
a share of the partnership losses in proportion to the partner's share of the profits.").
180. See discussion supra Part II.A.
181. Marriage is still for life, although like contracts generally, it may be
terminated before its term.
182. While the sincerity and details of spousal commitments vary, a formal
commitment of some type is part of what distinguishes marriage from more casual intimate
relationships. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of
Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1442-45 (2001) (noting an
argument that "what gives meaning to intimate allegiances is not the assumption of a formal
legal status, but the personal choice to commit to another").
183. Most marriages begin with the legal formalities of licensing and
solemnization. In other cases, parties enter common law marriages, which generally require
an agreement to be husband and wife, a public declaration, and cohabitation. ELLMAN ET
AL., supra note 62, at 134. Both paths result in legal marriage.
184. See Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9, at 119-
39; Starnes, Mothers as Suckers, supra note 9, at 1535-52.
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The Marital Partnership
(spousal commitment)
Spouse-1 Spouse-2
(spousal commitment)
If spouses happen to be parents, current law connects each parent to the
child in a relationship line distinct from the marital partnership. The parent-child
relationship appears as:
The Parent-Child Relationship
(parental obligation) (parental obligation)
Parent-1 ) Child ( Parent-2
The above two diagrams describe two freestanding, unconnected
relationship lines, one for spouses and another for parents. Responsibility for a
child's financial support and physical care is thus viewed as the individual
obligation of each parent. While married parents may combine and share their
responsibilities, as, for example, where one parent serves as primary caregiver and
the other as primary income producer, their arrangement is largely irrelevant to the
state, which continues to view each parent as individually liable for the child's
welfare."s
In a simple world, the marital partnership enjoys a natural life span,
enduring until the death of one spouse. In the real world of a near 50% divorce
rate, 1 however, affection may fade; and if it does, no-fault divorce laws allow
married parents to end their partnership freely and often unilaterally.1 8 7 Under no-
fault's partnership model of divorce, dissolution triggers a winding up of
185. So long as the child is not subject to abuse or neglect, the state assumes each
parent has met his or her individual responsibility. In cases of abuse or neglect, the state
may intervene to punish an individual parent, or both parents individually, but not to punish
the family collectively.
186. Marriages in the United States have barely a 50-50 chance of success.
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 92, at 418. The divorce rate has doubled since 1960. See NAT'L
MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA 18 (2007), available at http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/SOOU
2007.pdf.
187. Access to no-fault divorce is not much affected by the presence of minor
children, though some states have considered legislation that would make divorce less
accessible to couples with children. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 64, at 459. For an
interesting argument that there should be a special status for "marriages for the benefit of
minor children" that would presumptively preclude divorce and continue income sharing
during children's minority, see Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on
the American Family, 76 MINN. L. REv. 891, 900-14 (1992).
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partnership affairs' 88 during which custody, child support, property, and alimony
decisions are made. Winding up is usually a relatively speedy process that
concludes with termination of the marital partnership.'89 At this point, a final
divorce decree is entered, and each spouse emerges with an individual obligation
to his or her child but, at least as the clean-break myth has it, otherwise set free to
enjoy a fresh start, disentangled from a dead marriage.190 I have urged an
expansion of this simple partnership model, arguing that alimony can be loosely
analogized to a partnership buyout, which provides a much-needed rationale and
quantification model for alimony.191
In its analogy to partnership, divorce law stops here, limiting its focus to
the marital partnership and erroneously assuming that marriages with children are
no more complex than those without children. Not so.
B. The Co-Parenting Partnership
Simple visions of spousehood on the one hand and parenthood on the
other fail to capture the complexity of marriages with children. A married parent is
not simply a participant in two independent relationships one with the other spouse
and another with the child. From both a normative and a practical perspective,
children add another dimension to marriage, as adults who are legally committed
to each other as spouses undertake a new mutual commitment as parents. This
parental commitment runs not only to the child, to whom each parent owes an
independent state-imposed obligation, but also to the other parent, both spouses
understanding that they will share the physical and financial costs of parenting.
The result is a second layer of commitment between married parents-a co-
parenting partnership1 92 that supplements the marital partnership. The co-parenting
188. During windup, partners "complete the business of the partnership, liquidate
assets, settle liabilities, and distribute profits, if any, among the partners." Mark I.
Weinstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the
Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent Fee Cases and the No Compensation
Rule, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 857, 861 (1995).
189. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801 cmt. 2, 6 U.L.A. 189, 190 (2001)
("Under RUPA, 'dissolution' is merely the commencement of the winding up
process.... When the winding up is completed, the partnership entity terminates.").
190. For a discussion of clean-break myths in the economics of divorce, see supra
Part II.
191. See Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9, at 130-
38. This buyout would be calculated by measuring each spouse's enhanced earnings during
marriage, and multiplying any disparity in these enhanced earnings by a percentage based
on the length of the marriage. Most often, this buyout model will produce an alimony award
for the spouse who served as primary caretaker during marriage. A buyout does not aim to
address the opportunity costs of primary caretakers that occur after divorce since alimony is
a tool for structuring an equitable conclusion to the marital partnership. For a discussion of
alimony, see supra Part II.B.
192. I first proposed a parenting partnership model in Mothers as Suckers.
Starnes, Mothers as Suckers, supra note 9, at 1544-52. There, I sketched a rationale for
post-divorce income sharing based on an analogy to children as unfinished partnership
business. This Article emphasizes the distinction between the marital partnership and the
HeinOnline  -- 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 232 2012
LOVERS, PARENTS, AND PARTNERS
partnership builds on each parent's individual obligation to the child. This
partnership appears as:
The Co-Parenting Partnership
(co-parenting commitment)
Parent-I Parent-2
(co-parenting commitment)
(parental obligation) (parental obligation)
Child
Although the co-parenting commitment may be express, more often it is
implied, both spouses understanding that the addition of children to their family
means a shared commitment to raise those children. The child benefits from the
stability of the co-parenting partnership and from the mutuality of the parents'
commitment, which at least as a normative matter, makes childcare more
dependable, more bountiful, more efficient, and more manageable for parents.
While the state-imposed parental obligation requires only a minimal
standard of care enforced by actions for abuse or neglect, the co-parenting
commitment may incorporate the parents' desire to provide more. The state, for
example, requires parents to feed their children. If macaroni and cheese is on the
agenda, some parents believe it should be homemade with fontina or aged cheddar,
while others are content with the boxed variety.193 Neither type of macaroni and
cheese is legally compelled,194 but for some parents, only one type will do-and
that type, metaphorically speaking, becomes part of their co-parenting
commitment.
The co-parenting partnership does not displace the marital partnership.
While children may enrich and stretch and test a marriage, they do not, at least
normatively speaking, end a marriage. Children are often an important part of
marriage, but marriage is a relationship between adults that exists apart from
children. Marriages with children thus involve two simultaneous, complementary
partnerships-a marital partnership between two adults who make a commitment
to live as lifetime intimate partners, and a co-parenting partnership between two
co-parenting partnership and contends, more fundamentally, that the latter partnership
should survive divorce altogether.
193. The point is not to disparage boxed dinners, but rather to suggest the
pluralism that describes parental decisions about adequate and appropriate childrearing.
194. Whatever the parents' standard of care, so long as it does not fall below a
minimal threshold, the state is largely unconcerned. "Largely" is an important qualifier,
given recent government interest in urging parents to avoid the high-fat, sugary foods that
are often children's first choices.
2332012]1
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parents who make a commitment to share the rights and responsibilities of
parenting. During marriage, the marital partnership and the co-parenting
partnership work together to form a multi-layered family partnership. 195
When parents divorce during their child's minority, the marital
partnership terminates, but divorce does not so swiftly terminate the co-parenting
partnership, which endures at least until its work is complete, i.e., until the
couple's children reach majority.1 96 Continuation of the co-parenting partnership
does not depend on love, intimacy, or friendship between former spouses, but
rather on the parents' mutual commitment to take on the economic support and
physical labor required to raise shared children.
Divorced parents may coordinate their care for the child or they may
refuse to speak to each other. Whatever their inclination toward cooperation, each
divorced parent benefits from the other's physical labor on behalf of the child,
because what one parent does for the child the other parent need not do. As the
ALI observes, while parents "can allocate that responsibility [for children] ... they
cannot avoid it, and the spouse who assumes it discharges a legal obligation of
both parents."' 9 7 Simply put, if one parent provides the child with breakfast, the
other parent need not; if one parent shops for a winter coat or shoes or crayons, the
other need not; if one parent tutors the child, washes her pajamas, transports her to
school or soccer practice, the other need not. The point is that labor expended on
behalf of the child by one parent frees the other parent from the legal and moral
obligation to perform it. While parenting may be pleasant work, it is work
nonetheless-a point paid babysitters understand well enough.
As divorced co-parents continue to raise their children, the co-parenting
commitment provides a conceptual basis for income sharing between them, and for
new default rules that recognize, for the first time, a non-custodial parent's
affirmative responsibility to share income not only with his or her child, but also
with the other parent who is undertaking the lion's share of the daily labor required
to raise joint children. Disentangled from the marital commitment, the co-
parenting commitment stands as a distinct undertaking-one the law should
encourage parents to honor, and one whose termination the law should police with
an exit price. 198 Current law, however, does just the opposite, ignoring the co-
195. Although "family" is an ubiquitous image, it has no clear definition. See
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 92, at 33. Children are not necessary to the creation of a family.
Nor is marriage the exclusive means for creating a family. This Article uses marriage as a
simple, common, and clear, if non-exclusive, signal that a family has been formed.
196. One might argue that the co-parenting commitment is actually for life, just as
parenting is for life. It is true that throughout their children's lives, divorced parents will
typically continue to share the unique status of parents to mutual children-children who
are making their way through life, acquiring education or training, cohabiting, marrying,
divorcing, landing and losing jobs, giving birth to shared grandchildren. For purposes of this
Article, however, the term of the co-parenting commitment is set at the children's minority,
a term that is consistent with the state's compelling interest in the well-being of minor
children. Parents, of course, may opt into a longer-term co-parenting commitment.
197. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 5.05 Reporter's Notes cmt. a.
198. Because the co-parenting commitment is voluntarily undertaken, it may be
voluntarily terminated. But such termination should require payment of an exit price
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parenting commitment and encouraging divorcing partners to assume divorce
signals the end of all commitments between them, whether or not they share
children. 199 The default rules that produce this result are sticky, nudging spouses to
believe this is an appropriate divorce outcome. It is not. Divorce law must be
reconceptualized to reflect policy goals more consistent with the best interests of
children, their caretakers, and society at large. 200
Some may object to income sharing for primary caretakers on the grounds
that these parents already reap a huge reward in the form of psychic joy stemming
from their extensive time with children. This argument is unpersuasive. Most
fundamentally, psychic joy is simply not possible of measurement and so cannot
be quantified and then offset against a monetary award. Measurement is made
more challenging by the fact that time spent with children is a poor proxy for
psychic joy. A primary caretaker may spend much time tending to daily chores that
produce little joy-cleaning the macaroni and cheese off the floor, laundering,
shopping, cooking, and cleaning. The parent who spends less time with children
may actually experience more psychic joy than the other parent, especially if that
time is devoted more exclusively to child-intensive endeavors-time perhaps at the
zoo, the soccer field, the ice cream shop, or the library. Time is a poor proxy for
psychic joy. Moreover, the suggestion that psychic joy is time dependent raises
uncomfortable questions about the children themselves and their tendency to
inspire joy rather than sorrow or worry or frustration or any of the other psychic
costs of parenting that are likely to fall disproportionately on the parent with
primary residential responsibility.
designed to compensate the primary caretaker for the lost earnings he or she is likely to
experience as a result of caring for children. As Professors Thaler and Sunstein have noted,
setting an exit price is an important function of divorce law: "[A] primary reason for the
official institution of marriage has been not to limit entry but to police exit-to make it
difficult for people to abandon their commitments to one another." THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 221. Abandonment of one's co-parenting commitment should be difficult
indeed.
The exit price for terminating a co-parenting commitment might be analogized to a
partnership buyout. See Stames, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 9, at
130-38 (analogizing alimony to a partnership buyout). Termination of the co-parenting
partnership, of course, would not affect the obligation of each individual parent to the child,
i.e., to pay child support and otherwise to nurture and care for the child.
199. As previously noted, the role of divorce law in discouraging parents from
honoring co-parenting commitments is made worse if it is true, as some claim, that most
people are inclined to keep their promises. See supra note 14.
200. Some commentators have argued that the nuclear family should not be
expected to alone absorb the costs of children's care, either during or after marriage because
the costs of dependency are more properly borne by society at large. These scholars point to
the parent-child relationship rather than the spousal relationship as the core source of legal
obligation and the appropriate focus of family law regulation. Some call for abrogation of
marriage altogether. While my model of co-parenting commitments furthers a private-law
response to the costs of post-divorce caretaking, it also endorses calls for public
responsibility as a backup to private obligation. As Martha Fineman has so compellingly
charged, in the end dependency is everyone's responsibility. See Fineman, supra note 122.
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The partnership metaphor provides an interesting perspective on the argument that
income sharing would overcompensate a primary caretaker. Imagine the following
exchange between equal partners:
"Did you enjoy your day - working at the office [or the shop, the
restaurant, the car wash]?"
"Yes, very much . . "
"Well then, you have reaped your reward and we will reduce your
share ofpartnership income accordingly. "
Psychic joy is a dubious basis for keeping primary caretakers and their children at
a lower standard of living than the lesser-time parent.
The co-parenting partnership model I advocate in this Article provides a
rationale for new laws that require divorced parents to share the full costs of
parenting. Income sharing between parents may assume many forms and levels,
and will raise many old and a few new questions, some of them tough ones. So
there must be a next conversation, one that builds on the conceptual foundation for
income sharing offered here. The next Section identifies some of the issues that
should drive this conversation.
V. NEXT CONVERSATIONS:
BUILDING ON A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION
Income sharing between divorced parents might take many forms. Least
radically, the co-parenting commitment provides the basis for an expansion of
child support. In this new version of child support, parents would share not only
the costs of their children's food and shelter, but also the opportunity costs of
parenting. This approach might begin with a re-definition of "parental
expenditures on the child" to include the custodial parent's foregone wages and
decreased human capital. 201 More radically, the co-parenting commitment provides
the basis for a new toolbox to supplement the marital-termination tools of
property, alimony, and child support. This new tool for enforcing the co-parenting
commitment might be termed a co-parenting order.
As a foundational matter, sharing income should not depend on the
parents' willingness to cooperate or even to communicate with each other. Money
can be exchanged and opportunity costs shared no matter the level of acrimony
between parents.
An important issue for the next conversation will be the appropriate level
of income sharing.202 Since measuring the opportunity costs of a particular
201. Defining and measuring spending on children is required by the principle of
continuity of expenditures which drives child support guidelines. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text. The definition of parental expenditures on the child "is a matter of child
support policy, not something one looks up in a technical manual on economic statistics."
Ellman & Ellman, supra note 99, at 116.
202. A good case can be made that this level should be based on relative
household standards of living rather than simply on the parent's relative incomes. See supra
note 114 and accompanying text. It also seems clear, based on our experience with shared-
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caretaker is impractical, these costs might be presumptively identified as the
difference between the divorced parents' earnings, a method employed by the ALI
to measure the costs of past caretaking. 204 While income differential is not an
entirely satisfactory proxy, because "spouses are, on average, more similar in
socioeconomic status, at the time of their marriage, than are randomly chosen pairs
of people, a more accurate estimate of the foregone earning capacity is obtained by
comparing the obli ee's income to the obligor's than to an average from the
general population." The level of income sharing must be carefully calibrated to
ensure that the custodial parent does not bear an unfair share of the opportunity
costs of parenting; and also to ensure that neither parent is inappropriately
discouraged from job investments. The non-custodial parent should thus not give
up too much; the custodial parent should not gain too much. How much is "too
much" is of course no easy question. The ALI suggests in its new alimony
formulation that no payor should be required to pay more than 40% of his or her
income.206 Whatever level of income sharing is chosen, it should be clear,
predictable and widely known, published perhaps in the form of guidelines.
The next conversation should also identify intimate relationships other
than marriage that evidence commitment. Parents, of course, may expressly
contract into a co-parenting commitment. Without such an express agreement,
some relationships clearly evidence intimate commitment, so that the addition of
children to these families signals a co-parenting commitment. Easy examples of
such relationships include registered domestic partnerships and civil unions. Just
as easily, couples engaged in a one-night stand are clearly not committed and so do
not enter a co-parenting partnership. Nor do marriage-eligible cohabiting intimates
qualify as committed couples, unless perhaps the circumstances of their
relationship trigger a state-imposed status, as the ALI has proposed.207
parenting adjustments to child support, that income sharing should not focus on assigning
each parent's individual responsibility for the child based on the number of days the child
resides with each parent. See supra Part III.B.
203. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 5.05 cmt. d (observing that although
group data establish that caretaking has a "significant continuing impact on parental earning
capacity . .. it is often difficult to show in the particular case").
204. In section 5.05, the ALI Principles authorize compensatory spousal payments
for the spouse with an "earning-capacity loss arising from his or her disproportionate share
during marriage of the care of the marital children, or of the children of either spouse." Id. §
5.05(1). To presumptively measure earning capacity loss, the ALI calculates the spouses'
income disparity and multiplies that figure by a "child-care durational factor" based on the
length of the childcare period. See id. § 5.05(4).
205 Id. § 5.05 cmt. e.
206. Id. § 5.03 cmt. b.
207. See id. § 6.01 (proposing that the status of "domestic partners" be imposed
on couples who fall within an identified fact pattern). Washington State currently recognizes
such a status. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 357 (Wash. 2007) (recognizing the status
of "committed intimate relationship"). For a critique of this status-based approach to
cohabitants, see Garrison, supra note 10, at 854.
A related question concerns couples who commit to each other after they bear or adopt
a child. These are probably easy cases for a co-parenting commitment, dated from the time
of their commitment to each other rather than to the date of the child's birth or adoption.
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One complicating issue in inferring a co-parenting partnership between
committed intimates is the possibility that the parents are divided on their desire to
add a child to their family. The couple, for example, may agree never to have
children, but later the wife decides unilaterally to discontinue birth control.
Another couple may become "accidentally" pregnant, with one party advocating
abortion and the other resisting. One possible response to these cases is to say that
the addition of a child to the family signals the couples' understanding that they
will share responsibility for that child, whether or not they are joyful about the
prospect. Under this reasoning, the couple that breaks up because of their
disagreement about a new child does not enter a co-parenting commitment. A
pragmatic approach to these cases and others like them might be to create a
rebuttable presumption that spouses (and other legally committed intimates) who
add children to their family presumptively enter a co-parenting partnership; outside
these relationships no such presumption arises. 208 These default rules will not get
all cases right, but they will get most cases right.
Other issues that should drive the next conversation include many with
which family law is currently grappling: how to deal with new families, 209 multiple
parents,210 and unemployed or under-employed parents.211 Whatever
implementation tools are ultimately chosen, they must disentangle spousal and co-
parenting commitments and ensure that divorced mothers no longer bear
disproportionate responsibility for the costs of parenting.
208. For this point I am indebted to my colleague, Brian Kalt.
209. The question is whether children born subsequent to a child support order
provide a basis for a reduction in child support. Courts are split on this question-some
taking a "first in time, first in right" position that denies a reduction, others allowing a
reduction on the ground that all children deserve to share on a pro rata basis in their parent's
income. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 567-68. If there is no good answer to this
issue, one possibility is a compromise: New children provide a basis for resisting an action
to increase child support, but not a basis for an action to reduce child support. See LAURA
W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 3-51 (1996).
210. As Stephanie Coontz has noted:
The reproductive revolution has shaken up all the relationships once
taken for granted .. .. People who could not become parents before can
now do so in such bewildering combinations that a child can potentially
have five different parents: a sperm donor, an egg donor, a birth mother,
and the social father and mother who raise the child.
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR How LOVE
CONQUERED MARRIAGE 250 (2005). This possibility, however, should not pose much of a
problem for co-parenting partnerships, which are based on commitments to raise children
rather than biology.
211. The question is whether it is appropriate to impute income to a parent who
earns less than he or she could. Imputing income to the parent who pays child support may
increase the size of the child-support payment, thus theoretically, at least, providing an
incentive for the under or unemployed parent to increase earnings.
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CONCLUSION
For too long, family law has grappled ineffectively with a fundamental
problem: Although divorced parents share legal responsibility for their children,
the parent who serves as primary caretaker bears most of the opportunity costs
associated with that responsibility. Even though emerging custody norms teach
that divorce should not end spouses' role as co-parents, laws governing property,
alimony, and even child support, remain wed to the clean-break myth that divorce
can end or minimize all economic ties between spouses with children. Divorced
caretakers are thus told they must share rights to children, but that they should not
expect to share the family wage that once supported caretaking labor.
The solution to the conceptual bind of the primary caretaker lies in an
expanded vision of commitments between intimate partners and a narrowed vision
of the role of divorce. Family law must recognize that married parents are
committed to each other on two levels-as intimate partners through marriage and
as co-parenting partners through the addition of children to their family. Divorce
ends the marriage, but it does not end the parents' responsibility to share the
financial costs and daily labors required to raise their children to majority.
Disentangled from the marital commitment, the co-parenting commitment
provides a conceptual basis for income sharing between divorced parents of minor
children and ultimately an answer to the disparate costs of post-divorce caretaking.
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